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THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE INDE.
PENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS*
ROBERT, E.

CUSH MAN

There is an old Hindu fable, put into humorous verse by John G. Saxe,
about the six men of Indostan "to learning much inclined, who went to see
the Elephant (though all of them were blind)". Each in his groping touched
a different part of the beast's anatomy; and the six loudly announced in turn
that the elephant was like a wall, a spear, a snake, a tree, a fan, and a rope.
"And so these men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,

Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong
Though each was partly in the right
And all were in the wrong."
The technique of the six blind men in classifying the elephant appears to
have been followed by many who, at various times, have discussed the constitutional nature and status of the independent regulatory commissions. In
legislative hearings and debates, in lawyers' briefs, and in court decisions
there has been a readiness to state with dogmatic precision in which of the
three departments of government the commissions belong, .which of the three
powers of government they exercise, and other similarly definite facts about
their legal nature and relations. Thus one may collect at random the following labels applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission, not, it is true,
by blind men, but by men whose attention was closely riveted on some particular phase of the Commission's work or procedure:
"This Commission is in essence a judicial tribunal." (Commissioner
Prouty, 1907.)'
"The Commission is not a court. It is an administrative body."
(Chairman Knapp, 1902.)2

"The Commission is not a part of the executive branch of this government; but is really the arm of Congress." (Report of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 1912.) 3
"The Interstate Commerce Commission at the present time is an
executive body." (Commissioner Prouty, 1905.) 4
*This article constitutes a chapter in a forthcoming book by the author dealing with

-the independent regulatory commissions and their problems. The second and concluding

installment of the article will be published in the February issue of the Cornell Lazy
Quarterly.-Ed.
'Quoted in Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 65th Cong.,
3rd Sess. (1919) 309-310.
House Committee on Foreign and Interstate Commerce, 57th Cong.,
WHearings before269.
1st Sess. (1902)
3H. R. REP. No. 472, 62d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1912) 6.
'Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce purmsant to Senate Resolution 288, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1905) Vol. IV, p. 2863.
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"The Interstate Commerce Commission is a purely adminstrative
body." (Supreme Court of United States, 1912.)'
"The function exercised by the Commission is wholly legislative."
(Supreme Court of United States, 1927.)6
"The very able lawyers who, as members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, framed the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,
carefully avoided conferring on the Interstate Commerce Commission
any kind of power
except only executive power." (Senator Joseph B.
7
Foraker, 1906.)
Sound legal analysis is not likely to be aided by the process of "grasshopper exigesis" by which the statements just quoted are wrenched from their
contexts; and it is very dangerous to draw important inferences from them
or to try to fit them into artificial patterns. Each of the quotations given
has in it an element of truth; but no one of them contains all the truth.
Each statement resulted from the impact of some problem or circumstance
which centered attention upon part, but not all, of the commission's work
and relationships. They are not so inconsistent as they appear. Each makes a
contribution to a more complete and accurate appraisal of the status and
nature of the Commission. But what that contribution is can be estimated
only when We know the setting in which and the purpose for which the words
were uttered.
It is a rather remarkable fact that no serious attempt has thus far been
made to deal in a thorough and comprehensive way with the constitutional
problems involved in the nature of the independent regulatory commissions
and their intricate and perplexing relationships with the three major departments of government. In the first place, the Supreme Court of the United
States has, naturally, contributed nothing but piecemeal analysis of the problem. It has been obliged to answer many specific and definite questions
regarding the commissions. It has, in the main, wisely refrained from
unnecessary generalizations and has indulged in no essays on constitutional
law in which the commissions were broadly viewed. Most of the Court's
opinions bearing on the commissions are rationalizations of results deemed
essential to sound national administration rather than efforts to deal philosophically with the fundamental legal relations involved. For all this we
should be grateful and not critical. The regulatory commissions did not come
into being full-blown; they have evolved by the process of trial and error.
They have not remained static; they have taken on new forms and new
functions and entered into new relationships. It would have been calamitous
if the freedom of their growth and the flexibility of their structure and their
rInterstate Commerce Commission v. Humboldt Steamship Co., 224 U. S. 474, 484
(1911).
'United States v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 274 U. S. 564, 583 (1927).
'40 CONG. REc. 3107-8 (1906).
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relations with the departments of government had at an early date been
frozen into a fixed pattern by judicial decisions based upon what could only
have been a partial and inadequate view of the whole problem. The courts
have thrown much light upon the constitutional status of the regulatory
-commissions but they have done so by focussing spotlights upon special points.
In the second place, the same thing is true of the many valuable monographs
and articles dealing with the legal and constitutional problems relating to
the commissions and their work. They have dug deeply in narrow areas.
They have not attempted to cover the entire ground.
This article has a broader purpose. It attempts to pull together in one
place the more important facts about the commissions in their legal character
and relations, to appraise more carefully the place they occupy in our constitutional system, and to consider some of the constitutional problems relating
to them which remain unsolved. The discussion falls easily into two major
divisions. First, the commissions will be studied in the light of the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers, and the impact of that doctrine
-upon their structure, functions and relations. Second, we shall examine in
some detail the constitutional and legal relationships which the commissions
bear to Congress, to the President, and to the courts.
I.

THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS AND THE DOCTRINE
THE SEPARATION

OF

OF POWERS

Much ,as legislators and administrators would at
the fact remains that the American constitutional
fundamental doctrine of the separation of the three
The Constitution states (1) "All legislative powers
vested in a Congress of the United States" ;8 (2)

times like to forget it,
system rests upon the
powers of government.
herein granted shall be
"The executive power

shall be vested in a President of the United States of America" ;9 (3)

"The

judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
-and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."' 0 Thus are the three major powers of government "separated",
each being assigned to its own department or division, and thus does the Constitution seek to avert that threat to the liberties of the people which Montes.quieu and his followers believed must result from a merger of the three
powers, or any two of them, in the same hands. Furthermore, from these three
so-called "distributing clauses" is derived the constitutional rule that neither
the legislative, executive, or judicial power of the United States can be
delegated to any government, department, officer or agency other than that
in which the Constitution vests it. It is further inferred that each of the
CoNsT., Art. I, § 1, c. 1.
'Go Ts., Art. II, § 1, c. 1.
"CoNST., Art. II, § 1, c. 1.
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three departments is fully protected in the exercise of its own peculiar powers
from any interference or usurpation by any other department. In short, no
one of the three departments may either (1) give up or farm out any of
its own power or (2) take over or interfere with the power of any other
department.
Viewed superficially the independent regulatory commissions seem to violate the doctrine of the separation of powers at every vital point. They
seem to exercise simultaneously functions which are legislative, executive,
and judicial, thus merging in the same hands powers which ought to be
separately administered. At the same time the legislative and judicial powers
of the commissions appear to have been given to them in violation of the
constitutional rule that Congress may not delegate its legislative power, nor
confer the judicial power of the United States upon anyone except a duly
constituted federal court. Furthermore, if we assume that under the Constitution there are but three major departments of the United States government, it is not easy to fit the independent commissions into any single oneof these three departments to the exclusion of the others, nor to assert that
the functions which they perform are purely legislative, executive, or.judicial.
We may turn, therefore, to a closer analysis of the various problems arising
out of the doctrine of the separation of powers which the independent commissions present.
A.

THE MERGER IN

THE HANDS

LATIVE, EXECUTIVE,

OF THE COMMISSIONS

OF LEGIS-

AND JUDICIAL POWERS

Is there an unconstitutional merger in the hands of the independent regulatory commissions of legislative, executive, and judicial powers-powers.
which, under the doctrine of the separation of powers, must be kept separate?
That such a merger of powers does exist was one of the first charges to be
hurled against the proposed Interstate Commerce Commission in the Congressional debates in 1886;11 while Senator Burke of Nebraska in a radio.
speech in April, 1938, urging the amendment of the Wagner Act, said of the
National Labor Relations Board:
"The Board, through its employees, acts as prosecuting attorney. Also
as a judge. It has investigated the case. It prosecutes the cause. It sits
in solemn judgment thereon. Investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury,
all wrapped up in one."' 2
In fact, criticism of the regulatory commissions on this score seems to grow
more persistent and more virulent rather than less so.
It is natural that this charge of improper merging of powers in the com'Infra, p. 18.
'This speech was printed in the Congressional Record of April 5, 1938.
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missions should be strongly urged, for the chief concrete advantage to be
gained from the three-fold separation of powers is supposed to be the protection of individual liberty against the dangers resulting from the merging of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the same hands. Montesquieu,
-the author of the classical doctrine, vigorously stressed this point:
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magisirates, there can be no liberty,
because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should
enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again,
there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the
judge would be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power,
the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be
an end of everything were the same man, or the same body, whether
-of the nobles or of the people, to exercise these three powers, that of
enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the
causes of individuals."' 3
Madison in The Federalist declared more briefly but more sharply:
"The accumulation of all powers, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary,
in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the ve-y
definition of tyranny."' 4
IDissenting in the Myers case, Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
"The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise
of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by
means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from
5
autocracy."'
And in 1933, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland.
declared:
"The Constitution, in distributing the powers of government, creates
three distinct and separate departments-the legislative, the executive,
and the judicial. This separation is not merely a matter of convenience
or of governmental mechanism. Its object is basic and vital . . .namely,

to preclude a commingling of these essentially different powers of government in the same hands."' 6
It is to be expected, therefore, that any governmental agency in which legis'MONTESQUIEU,
THE SPIRIT OF THE
'THE FEDERALIST (1788)
No. 47.

LAWs

(1748) Book XI, c. 6.

'Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 293 (1926).
"O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516, 530 (1933).
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lative, executive and judicial powers appear to be merged in the same hands
will be subject to the closest scrutiny to determine whether the basic doctrine
of separation has in reality been violated.
Let us examine more closely the steady barrage of attack on this ground
which has been directed against the independent regulatory commissions from
the very beginning. It has been mentioned that the point was raised in the
debates on the Interstate Commerce Act in 18 8 6 .17 Mild as were the powers
given to the Interstate Commerce Commission in that early act, Senator
Morgan of Alabama charged that the statute "combined very skillfully powers
from all three departments",' 8 while Mr. Oates in the House declared:
"I believe that it is absolutely unconstitutional and void, because to
my mind it is a" blending of the legislative, the judicial, and perhaps,
the executive powers of the government in the same law."' 9
When Congress was considering, in 1902, a bill enlarging the regulatory
powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Mr. Walker D. Hines, then
President of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, told a Senate Committee
that the Commission
"is supervisor, detective, prosecutor, plaintiff, attorney, and court. No
tribunal charged with such functions can have the attributes which
ought to characterize a judicial tribunal," 20
and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge spoke of the Commission as a body
"who are to be in the operation and discharge of their functions judge,
jury, and prosecuting officer resembling nothing that I can think of
except the French Juge d'Instruction."'
In 1916, as it became apparent that even wider powers were likely to be
given to the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Association of Railway
Executives restated more elaborately the constitutional attack on the merger
of powers in the hands of the Commission. They said:
"The Interstate Commerce Commission is likewise clothed with different functions which are inconsistent and which violate the principle
that the legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be kept
separate and distinct.
" . . The foundation of our liberties is the separation of what are
termed inconsistent functions of government. You have one judicial
department; you have one executive department which is not judicial
and not legislative; you have one legislative department which is not
judicial and which is not executive. The ideal of free government is
that those functions shall be kept distinct from one another. It was
"'Supra,p. 16.
117
CONG. REC. 4422 (1886).
1918 CONG. REc. 848 (1887).
'Hearings before House Commnittee on Foreign and Interstate Commerce, 57th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1902) 493.
140 CONG. REc. 4104 (1906).

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
thought that if a legislator should be a judge there would be no use for
the judge, because he would sustain his act as legislator, and so with
these other functions; in order to be useful each department must be
protected from invasion by the other. And yet we find that wholesome
government principle is violated in the present organization of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. They are judges; they are, in a
measure, legislators;
and they are administrators of the system of
'22
regulation.
It may be noted that some of the recent proposals looking toward a reorganization of the Commission's structure and functions call for some sort
of segregation of duties which would meet this objection.
The same constitutional attack was urged with equal if not greater vigor
during the debates in Congress in 1914 against the alleged merger of powers
in the Federal Trade Commission. Private rights appeared to be even more
seriously jeopardized here because the power of the Federal Trade Commission to issue a cease and desist order condemning an unfair competitive
trade practice came much closer to being a penal or disciplinary power than
the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to determine a reasonable
rate. The argument was clearly stated in the Senate by Senator Shields of
Tennessee who said:
"Mr. President, I believe that the powers of all three of the co-ordinate
branches of the government are proposed to be delegated to and vested
in this commission. The commission is authorized to declare what constitutes unfair competition or unfair methods of competition thus exercising legislative powers in creating offenses both civil and criminal, and
it also has the power to repeal such legislation by altering or vacating
any order it may make in any particular case. The worst part of the
legislative power, however, is that the commission is authorized to give
it a retrospective effect; in other words, the commission may, after the
act is done or committed for the first time, declare that such an aet
constitutes unfair competition and violation of law.
"The commission is given judicial power by the authority to call the
offender before it, to hear proof, and determine his guilt or innocence.
Executive power is conferred by the authority to bring suit in the district courts of the country to enforce such orders as it may make. It
is difficult for me to conceive a more pronounced and unlawful confusion and delegation of the powers of the three co-ordinate branches
of our government than is here attempted to be done." 23
Every independent commission which has exercised any substantial regulatory
power has been sharply attacked on this same ground.
The Supreme Court, however, has never held void any of the statutes
'Appendix, Extension of Tenure of Government Control of Railroads. Hearings before
the Committee on Interstate Commerce, U. S. Senate, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1916) Vil.
II, p. 104.
351 CONG. RFc. 13057 (1914).
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in which alleged mergers of legislative, executive, and judicial powers occur,
nor has it given the slightest encouragement to those who attack the regulatory commissions on this c6nstitutional ground. It appears, in fact, to be
wholly unimpressed by the objection. And this is certainly not due to
unawareness of the situation at issue. In Federal Trade Commission v.
Klesner, Mr. Justice Brandeis observed:
"While the Federal Trade Commission exercises under § 5 the func24
tions of both prosecutor and judge, the scope of its authority is limited.
There is no indication that this combination of executive and judicial power
caused any constitutional tremors in the mind of Mr. Justice Brandeis. The
present judicial attitude is clearly stated by a lower federal court in these
words:
"The spectacle of an administrative tribunal acting as both prosecutor
and judge has been the subject of much comment, and efforts to do away
with such practice have been studied for years. The Board of Tax Appeals is an outstanding example of one such successful effort. But it
has never been held that such procedure denies constitutional right. On
the contrary, many agencies have functioned for years, with the approval
of the courts, which combine these roles. The Federal Trade Commission
investigates charges of business immorality, files a charge in its own
name as plaintiff, and then decides whether the proof sustains the charges
it has preferred. The Interstate Commerce Commission and state Public
Service Commissions may prefer complaints to be tried before themselves. If an administrative tribunal may on its own initiative investigate,
file a complaint, and then try the charge so preferred, due process is
one or more members of the board aided in
not denied here because
'25
the investigation.

By completely ignoring the whole question, the Supreme Court has left
us without any judicial explanation justifying its tacit assumption that the
alleged merger of the three powers of government in the hands of a single
regulatory body does not violate the doctrine of the separation of powers.
It is not difficult, however, to suggest a number of cogent reasons why the
Court has not invalidated the regulatory commissions on grounds of an invalid merger of powers. These may be briefly stated. First, regulatory commissions exercising these questionable combinations of powers had been in
successful operation for many years before anyone thought of urging upon
the Supreme Court this particular argument against their validity. The Court
had upheld the constitutionality of the regulatory commission technique before this objection was seriously felt or presented. The state railroad commission, the prototype of the later federal commission, received the Supreme
Court's blessing in the Railroad Commission Cases26 in 1886. When the
'Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 27 (1929).
'Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F. (2d) 351, 356-357 (C. C. A. 10th 1936).
116 U. S.307 (1886).
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validity of the Interstate Commerce Act was attacked in Interstate Commerce"
Commission v. Brimso 2 7 in 1894, the Court held that judicial powers had
not been given to the Interstate Commerce Commission in violation of the
doctrine of the separation of powers, and the broader point that legislative,
executive and judicial powers were invalidly merged was neither argued nor
ruled upon. And when in 1919 a lower court was asked to pass for the first
time upon an order of the Federal Trade Commission it sustained the statute
with the comment that "Grants of similar authority to administrative officers
and bodies have not been found repugnant to the Constitution" ;28 while the
Supreme Court merely assumed the validity of the Federal Trade Commission
Act without directly commenting on it.29 In short, the regulatory commission, with its inherent merger of powers, was a fait accompli long before any
serious constitutional attack was made on it on the basis of that merger.
Second, the Supreme Court has always interpreted the doctrine of the
separation of powers with great flexibility. The very fact that the Constitution itself contains important deviations from a strict separation of powers,
deviations deemed necessary to the smooth running of the governmental
machine, could hardly fail to impress on the Court that a rigid or mechanical
application of the doctrine is both unnecessary and unwise. As Frankfurter
and Landis put it:
"Nor has it [the doctrine of separation of powers] been treated by the
Supreme Court as a technical legal doctrine. From the beginning that
Court has refused to draw abstract, analytical lines of separation and
has recognized necessary areas of interaction."30
It is not surprising, therefore, that it has refrained from striking down
long established, successful, and necessary governmental institutions because
of a supposed violation of this not very sharply defined doctrine.
Third, the powers of government which, under the doctrine of the separation of powers, must be kept separate, are the legislative, executive, and
judicial powers granted by the Constitution to Congress, to the President, and
to the constitutional courts. These powers, therefore, could not be invalidly
merged in a regulatory commission unless, in turn, they had been granted
to that commission. Now the Supreme Court, as we shall shortly see, 31
has steadily denied that either legislative or judicial power in the constitutional sense has been granted to the commissions. If the commis-154 U. S. 447 (1894).
'Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307, 311 (C. C. A. 7th
1919).
'See McFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CO1MMISSION AND INTERSTATE COIMERCE CommIssION, 7-8, and cases cited.

3'Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contenipt
in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers (1924) 37 HARV. L.
REv. 1010.

"Infra, p. 27 ff.
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sions do not enjoy the legislative and judicial powers separated by the distributing clauses of the Constitution, then obviously those powers have not
been unconstitutionally merged in creating the commissions. The powers
exercised by the regulatory commissions may be mixed, but they are not
the powers which it is constitutionally improper to mix. Or to put it a
little differently, the Constitution "separates" legislative, executive, and
judicial powers; but it d6es not separate "quasi-legislative", "administrative",
and "quasi-judicial" powers.
Fourth, the courts did not wish to find the regulatory commissions unconstitutional since they regarded them as necessary and desirable. They
were not impressed, therefore, by any constitutional objections which were
not inescapable. As the Supreme Court became increasingly familiar with the
commissions and with the problems with which they were dealing, it came
to feel that the commission technique was indispensable to the successful
handling of the difficult tasks involved in the government regulation of
business. Strong governmental necessity could not be lightly ignored. 2 As
the Brimson case, had pointed out that
early as 1894 the Supreme Court, in"
the regulatory commission was indispensable to the effective exercise of the
commerce power. It said:
"An adjudication that Congress could not establish an administrative
body with authority to investigate the subject of interstate commerce and
with power to call witnesses before it, and to require the production of
books, documents and papers relating to that subject, would go far towards defeating the object for which the people of the United States
placed commerce among the states under national control. All must
recognize the fact that the full information necessary as a basis of intelligent legislation by Congress from time to time upon the subject of
interstate commerce cannot be obtained, nor can the rules established
for the regulation of such commerce be efficiently enforced, otherwise
than through the instrumentality of an administrative body, representing
the whole country, always watchful of the general interests, and charged
but of
with the duty not only of obtaining the required information,
'83
compelling by all lawful methods obedience to such rules."
The district court made the same point more sharply in commenting on the
Federal Trade Commission in the Sears-Roebuck case. It said:
'Professor Sharfman has accurately summarized this pragmatic judicial attitude: "In
all probability, however, the argument of expediency proved most effective in dissolving
legal doubts. Since Congress itself possessed neither the special knowledge nor the
necessary time for performing the continuous technical tasks of rate-making, and since
judicial control was by its very nature inadequate (involving judgments on the validity
of existing adjustments, but without capacity or equipment for prescribing appropriate
corrective measures in the future) there was no choice but to delegate rate-making
power to an expert, continuously functioning, administrative tribunal. In other words,
the very purpose-effective rate control-which Congress sought to achieve could be
consummated only through such delegation of legislative authority." 1 THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) 46, n.
'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 474 (1894).
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"With the increasing complexity of human activities many situations
arise where governmental control can be secured only by the 'Board'
or 'Commission' form of legislation."8 4
This disposition of the courts to regard the- independent regulatory commissions as vitally necessary parts of the mechanism of modern government
tends to increase rather than diminish. With it disappears any hope of commission critics that those bodies will ever be held inherently unconstitutional
because of allegedly invalid merging of powers.
Fifth, from the very beginning the work of the regulatory commissions
has, in all really important particulars, been held closely subject to judicial
review.85 By this judicial review the courts have been able to set aside
orders or decisions of the commissions which they regarded as ultra ires,
unjust, or otherwise subversive of private rights. This being so, the alleged
merger of powers becomes unimportant since the Court is able to see that
no substantial injustice results. If the major reason for keeping the powers
of government separate is to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power, and if
the exercise of arbitrary power from whatever cause is effectively prevented
by judicial review, then there is no reason for the Court to worry separately
over the supposed merger of powers. Had we not had this close judicial
scrutiny of commission work the constitutional objection we are discussing
might have received more serious attention.
Finally, it has been much easier and more satisfactory to the Court to keep
its constitutional scrutiny of the regulatory commissions within the broad
and flexible limits of the test of due process of law than to try to work with
the vague doctrine of the separation of powers. Had the due process test
not been available the Court might possibly have invoked the separation of
powers theory. But it has not been necessary to do that and it is obvious now
that it will never be done. While the issue has not arisen squarely with respect
to the powers of the regulatory agencies, the Supreme Court has held that a
violation of the doctrine of the separation of powers does not per se amount
to a denial of due process of law.36 Any other interpretation would, of
course, have imposed the orthodox doctrine of separation of powers in its
entirety upon every state in the Union by the simple operation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a result which in some cases
'Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307, 312 (C. C. A. 7th
1919).
'This problem will be discussed in greater detail in the second part of this article.
"'"Whether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of a state shall be kept

altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons belonging
to one department may, in respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly speak-

ing, pertain to another department of government, is for the determination of the state.
And its determination one way or the other cannot be an element in the inquiry whether
the due process of law prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment has been respected by
the state or its representatives when dealing with matters involving life or liberty."

Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 84 (1902).
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would have been almost revolutionary in its practical effects. It is entirely
possible, however, that a merger of powers might take such a form as to
amount to a denial of due process. Should Congress create a- regulatory
agency in which legislative, executive, and judicial powers were fused in such
a manner as to invite and effect arbitrary abridgement of private rights, I
think we may safely assume that the Supreme Court would protect those
rights by invoking the constitutional guarantee that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law" rather than
by invoking the doctrine of the separation of powers. In short, if there was
ever any vitality at all in the constitutional principle that the three powers
of government may not validly be merged in the same hands, it has long
since been assimilated to the much more flexible and practicable doctrine of
due process.
Those who attack the regulatory commissions because of what they regard
as an objectionable merger of powers in the same hands have not been
silenced by the failure of the Supreme Court to regard the merger as a
constitutional defect. They have lost their case in the courts; but they
continue to train their guns on Congress in an effort to secure corrective
legislation and to prevent the creation of new agencies open to the same
objection. The Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar Association has interested itself in this problem for several years. In its report
in 193637 it made an elaborate analysis of the separation of powers doctrine
as applied to the federal regulatory agencies. This is perhaps the most
thorough statement of the argument, constitutional and political, against the
merger of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the hands of the
independent commissions and other administrative agencies.. Recognizing
frankly that no help could be expected from the courts on the constitutional
point, the Commitee proposed the creation of an administrative court in
order to tighten up the judicial review of the findings of fact and law of
all federal regulatory commissions and officers. Thus, it was believed, the
danger to private rights implicit in the objectionable merger of powers could
be averted. In 1936 the President's Committee on Administrative Management in a report based, so far as it related to this point, upon a memorandum
prepared by the writer of this article, criticized sharply the merging of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the regulatory commissions. 88 It
was urged that the commission was obliged to perform its judicial or quasijudicial functions in the "unneutral" atmosphere created by its legislative
and executive responsibilities. A plan was suggested by which it was believed
the objection could be met by a segregation of the commissions' work in the
=(1936) 61 A. B. A. RP. 720-794. The writer has made generous use of the valuable
material found in this report.
'CUSHMAN, THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1936).
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hands of an administrative section and a judicial section. From other quarters have come proposals for such internal rearrangements of the structure
and functions of the regulatory commissions as will prevent the same officials
from exercising incompatible powers.89 There may be a merger of powers
in the commission; but it is proposed to prevent such merger in the hands
of one man or set of men within the commission. These various proposals
are mentioned to emphasize the fact that this problem of the merger of
powers in the independent regulatory commissions has moved completely
from the field of constitutional law into the field of public policy.
The issue has not been confined to this country. The same problem
has attracted attention in England as well. In 1929 Lord Chief Justice Hewart
published'his The New Despotism in which he sharply attacked the trends
in English administration and administrative law, and particularly charged
that judicial powers over the rights of the citizen were being given to executive and administrative officers. The Committee on Ministers' Powers was
set up to study the problems presented in Lord Hewart's attack and in 1932
they filed their valuable report. They criticized sharply the emergence of the
"prosecutor-judge" combination in modern administration and declared that
"The first and most fundamental principle of natural justice is that a man
may not be judge in his own cause."40 They urged Parliament to exert
great care to see that judicial duties should not be conferred bn administrative
officers.
B. DELEGATION OF POWERS TO THE COMMISSIONS
The most important corollary of the doctrine of the separation of powers is
that the powers given to the three departments may not be delegated to
other departments or agencies. If the legislative power is vested in Congress,
the executive power in the President, etc., then it seems logically to follow
that those powers cannot be farmed out to anybody else. This doctrine of
the non-delegability of legislative and judicial powers is, in fact, the phase
of the separation of powers theory which has most frequently and seriously
engaged the attention of the Supreme Court and been applied most often as
a judicial yardstick. The problems connected with the delegation of powers
have been discussed by numerous writers. It is neither necessary nor possible
to explore here in any detail the results of their analyses. All that our
present purpose requires is a survey of the means by which the powers given

by Congress to the independent regulatory commissions have been so rationalized as to avoid conflict with the constitutional prohibition against delegation.
'Typical of these is the proposal made by Gerard C. Henderson with reference to
the Federal Trade Commission. See his volume THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSmO
(1925) 328-333.
"Report of Committee on Ministers" Powers, 76.
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In no instance has any grant or delegation of power to any commission been
held by the Court to violate the rule against delegation; and yet laymen and
judges alike agree that the commissions exercise legislative, administrative,
and judicial powers. How has this paradoxical result been achieved?
1. Have legislative powers been delegated to the commissions?
Let us consider first whether Congress has delegated legislative power
to the regulatory commissions. Viewed realistically, and with the refinements of a technical constitutional vocabulary left out of account, every commission appears to exercise legislative power in at least one way, and some
of them in two. In the first place, every regulatory commission has the power
to issue rules and regulations: the power of sub-legislation. These rules
and regulations may be grouped and classified and labelled in various ways
upon the basis of distinctions of one kind or another, and much careful
analysis has been engaged in to discover and catalog their varying characteristics. 41 They are all, however, legislative in nature. They have in varying
degrees the force of law and their violation may by Congress be made punishable as is the violation of any federal criminal statute. They are rules and
regulations which Congress itself could put into statutory form if it had the
time and the information, and if it was sensible to "freeze" such regulations
into an act of Congress. No one who scans the voluminous regulations of
the Interstate Commerce Commission in the field of safety appliance requirements or motor vehicle licensing can fail to realize that here is a body of
legislation vastly more important than many of the formal statutes passed
by Congress itself. The same is true of the similar legislative output of the
Federal Communications Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and most of the others. It is customary to refer to the important
work of formulating rules and regulations in the language of Marshall as
the process of "filling up the details" of legislative policy as formulated by
42
Congress in the basic statute from which the rule-making power comes.
The fact remains that Congress is perfectly free to fill in these details itself,
in statutory form, if it wishes to do so, and not infrequently it does. The
legislative character of the job is obvious, no matter who performs it. It is
unnecessary to point out that this power to issue rules and regulations has
been conferred by Congress from the foundation of our government upon
executive and administrative officers. It is by no means confined to the
regulatory commissions.
'Valuable

studies in this field have been made by Professor James Hart. See his

THE ORDINANCE MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (192 ),
and his memorandum on The Exercise of Rile Making Power in PRESIDENT'S CoimITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT: REPORT WITH SPECIAL STUDIES (1937)

309-355.

'VWayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42 (U. S. 1825).
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A second way in which legislative power is exercised by some of the
regulatory commissions is more specialized and distinctive. Here Congress
embodies in a statute a legislative "standard" or principle which it believes
should guide business conduct or control business relations, and delegates
to the regulatory commission the power to make that "standard" effective
by the issuance of orders of continuing operation which apply that "standard"
to concrete situations. It is this power which the Interstate Commerce Commission exercises in issuing a railroad rate order. Congress has declared by
law that railroad rates shall be "just and reasonable" and has given to the
Commission the job of determining in a concrete situation what a "just and
reasonable" rate is, and of issuing an order establishing that rate. Acting
under this grant the Commission two years ago reduced eastern passenger
coach fares to two cents per mile, and a few months ago raised them to two
and one-half cents per mile.
It is agreed that this rate-making function is legislative in character. The
Supreme Court has so described it repeatedly. 48 Railroad rates and other
public utility rates were originally fixed by the legislature itself. In some
states they are still fixed on occasion by statute. There is no doubt whatever
of the constitutional power of Congress to embody in a statute each individual
railroad rate now established by the Interstate Commerce Commission, but
there are definite reasons why it has turned over the task to the Commission.
First, Congress lacks the time and technical knowledge to handle the job.
Second, if rates are to be kept fair, they must be subject to frequent readjustment; there must be a flexibility in the process which is beyond the
capacity of a legislative body. And finally, for the protection of the rights
both of the public and the carriers it is felt necessary to fix, rates by a procedure which is semi-judicial in character, a procedure which a legislative
body is not equipped to follow. It is much more common for Congress to
confer'this type of power upon an independent board or agency than to delegate it to a single officer in the executive department. It did, however, give
rate-making power to the Secretary of Agriculture in the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921.
What has been the attitude of the courts toward these delegations of
power? Briefly, that attitude has taken shape in a settled judicial determination to uphold these delegations of power as vitally necessary to the administration of government, and at the same time to avoid sacrificing the constitutional theory that legislative powers cannot be delegated. This seemingly
difficult problem of eating its constitutional cake and having it too the
Court has very adroitly solved. Its success is shown by the fact that in no
case have the wide powers given to the independent regulatory commissions
"SUnited States v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 274 U. S. 564, 583 (1933);
Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468,.479 (1936).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
been held to involve unconstitutional delegation, while at the same time the
doctrine that Congress cannot constitutionally delegate its legislative power
seems as hale and hearty as ever. In reaching this happy result the Court
has resorted to two rather different methods which may be briefly described.
The first of these methods, and the one earliest used, is to use labels or
definitions which avoid the constitutional difficulties. Much may be accomplished in an argument if one is allowed to write his own definitions. If
the power which it is necessary to delegate to regulatory agencies can be
called something other than "legislative power", then the constitutional rule
is left intact. This may be put in the form of a syllogism, as follows:
Major premise: Legislative power cannot be constitutionally delegated
by Congress.
Minor premise: It is absolutely necessary that certain powers be delegated to administrative officers and regulatory commissions.
Conclusion: Therefore the powers thus delegated are not legislative
powers.
The logical hiatus in this reasoning may be concealed by attaching a distinctive name to the powers thus delegated. And this is what the Court has
done. In fact, it has used two names: first, "administrative", and second,
"quasi-legislative"."
The term "administrative" was a happy term to apply to the sub-legislative
powers given to administrative officers and commissions. It is not a word
used in the Constitution itself, it is certainly a different word from"the word
"legislative", and there is no authoritative definition giving it precise and
accurate meaning. Thus in the case of United States v. Grimaud in 1911,
the power of the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations for grazing on
public lands, regulations enforceable through criminal process, was upheld.
Mr. Justice Lamar said:
"In the nature of things it was impracticable for Congress to provide
general regulations for these various and varying details of management.
Each reservation had its peculiar and special features; and in authorizing
the Secretary of Agriculture to meet these local conditions, Congress was
merely conferring administrative functions
upon an agent, and not
' 45
delegating to him legislative power.
Precisely the same doctrine would, of course, apply to the delegation of
similar rule-making power to an independent regulatory commission.
Perhaps even more useful to the Court has been the prefix "quasi" which
"This logical device is somewhat similar to that employed by Mr. Justice Iredell in
the Hylton case in 1796 to prove that a tax on carriages is not a direct tax within
the meaning of the Constitution. He said: "As all direct taxes must be apportioned,
it is evident that the Constitution contemplated none as direct but such as could be
apportioned. If this cannot be apportioned, it is, therefore, not a direct tax in the sense
of the Constitution." Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171, 181 (U. S. 1796).
"220 U. S.506, 516 (1911).
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can be attached to the terms "legislative" and "judicial". Legislative power
cannot constitutionally be delegated by Congress; but there is no prohibition
against the delegation of "quasi-legislative" powers. According to Mr. Justice Sutherland in the Humphreys case, 46 "quasi-legislative power" is what
the Federal Trade Commission enjoys, along with "quasi-judicial" power.
Now the term "quasi-legislative", in contrast to the term "quasi-judicial"
which has achieved something approximating a settled meaning and application, does not seem to have any commonly accepted concrete significance. It
means merely something "almost, but not exactly" legislative. It therefore
helps save the day for the doctrine of the non-delegability of legislative power
without committing the Court to any precise definition of the kind of power
which has been delegated. Congress, in short, has not invalidly delegated
legislative power to the regulatory commissions because the power which it
.has delegated turns out to be "quasi-legislative" and not legislative.
A second judicial attitude toward this problem of delegation of legislative
power tends to discard this juggling of definitions and labels and deal more
directly with the realities involved. It seems to be replacing in legal analysis
and judicial decision the method just discussed. This second judicial theory
may be put thus: Power which is essentially legislative in character is delegated to the independent regulatory commissions. It is neither necessary nor
desirable to disguise the legislative nature of this power by the use of labels.
But legislative power has not been delegated within the meaning of the
constitutional rule if that power must be exercised by the commission within
the limits of a legislative policy or "standard" blocked out with reasonable
clearness in the statute by which Congress granted the power. To put it in
the words of Mr. Justice Sutherland (who used both techniques as occasion
arose) :"Congress cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except
under the limitation of a prescribed standard." 47
The judicial and professional willingness to recognize that legislative
power has been and must be delegated by Congress to other governmental
agencies appears with increasing frequency. In his presidential address to
the American Bar Association in 1916 Elihu Root asserted:
"Before these agencies [the administrative tribunals], the old doctrine
prohibiting the delegation of legislative powers has virtually retired from
the field and given up the fight. There will be no withdrawal from these
experiments. We shall go on; we shall expand them, whether we approve
theoretically or not; because such agencies furnish protection to right,
and obstacles to wrong-doing, which under our new social and industrial
"Humphreys' Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935).
"'United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 282 U. S.311, 324 (1931).
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conditions cannot be practically accomplished by the old and
simple
'48
procedure of legislatures and courts as in the last generation.
In responding to the resolutions of the Attorney-General upon the death of
Chief Justice White, Chief Justice Taft, referring to White's decision holding
that legislative power had not been delegated to the Interstate Commerce
Commission, said:
"The Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized to exercise
powers the conferring of which by Congress would have been, perhaps,
thought in the earlier years of the Republic to violate the rule that no
legislative power can be delegated. But the inevitable progress and exigencies of government and the utter inability of Congress to give the
time and attention indispensable to the exercise of these powers in detail
forced the modification of the rule." 49
,So generous, in fact, was- the Court's treatment of what appeared to be
delegations of legislative power to regulatory commissions and administrative officers that Professor E. S. Corwin was led to remark in 1934 that
"Congress is enabled to delegate its powers whenever it is necessary
and proper to do so in order to exercise them effectively." 50
The requirement that legislative power, if delegated, must be delegated
"under the limitation of a prescribed standard" was still insisted upon by
the Court, but the "standards" set up became in some cases so vague as to
appear almost meaningless, so vague that they imposed small restraint upon
the discretion of the commission or officer to whom the power was delegated. 5'
In two important cases, however, the Supreme Court proceeded to take
up this slack and sharpen the meaning and application of its present rule
regarding delegations of legislative power. In Panan Refining Co. v.
Ryan52 and in the Schechter case5 3 the Court held void delegations of legislative power to the President on the ground that the National Industrial
Recovery Act, in its relevant sections, set up no effective standards or criteria
to serve as limitations upon the President's uncontrolled discretion. The net
result seems to be, therefore, that while the "standards" limiting the delegations of legislative power may be vague, they may not be too vague, and
they certainly must not be,-wholly lacking. A standard is too vague when it
does not offer a guide which can be seen and followed by the officer or
commission in exercising the delegated power. Or, stated a bit differently,
'-(1916) 41 A. B. A. REP,. 368-369.
"Proceedings on the Death of Chief Justice White, 257 U. S. xxv-xxvi (1922).
'CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934) 145.
'New York Central Securities Corporation v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932)
Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930).
n293 U. S. 388 (1935).
'Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
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the standard must be of such clearness and of such character as to be visible
to the naked eye of the Court, so that that tribunal can determine whether
the officer or agency is following the standard instead of exercising uncontrolled discretion.
This really reduces itself to the fact that in dealing with the delegation of
legislative power the Supreme Court has essentially paralleled, though
without the corresponding labels, the situation which exists with regard to
federal judicial power and has recognized the existence of two grades of
legislative power, one which cannot constitutionally be delegated by Congress,
and one which can. By Article III of the Constitution "the judicial power
of the United States" is given to the Supreme Court and the inferior federal
courts created by Congress. No shred of this judicial power has been or
can be given to any officer or agency save only the regularly constituted
United States courts. This principle has been enforded with absolute
rigidity. Practical necessity has, however, required from time to time that
"judicial power" be given to agencies which are not courts created under
Article III. Congress could not effectively exercise its delegated powers
without making such grants. The Supreme Court solved the problem by
holding that there are two categories of judicial power possible under the
Constitution. There is "the judicial power of the United States" which is
granted by Article III and which, as we have seen, cannot be granted
except to the constitutional courts; and there is a less sacrosanct, or garden
variety of judicial power which Congress, in exercising its delegated powers,
may give to "legislative courts".5 4 Inherently the two kinds of power are

essentially the same, although they operate usually in different fields. The
exercise of each has the same effect upon those within its reach. But one
can be granted to other than constitutional courts, the other ,cannot. In
much the same way the courts have actually recognized two categories of
federal legislative power. There is the legislative power which, for the sake
of pursuing the analogy, might plausibly be labelled "the legislative power
of the United States", the unfettered legislative discretion conferred by the
Constitution upon Congress. This may not be delegated. But there is in
addition, a lesser variety of legislative power which Congress in the carrying
out of its legislative responsibilities may delegate to independent regulatory
commissions or to administrative officers. This second type of legislative
power, however, is really "sub-legislative" power in the sense that it must
be exercised within the limits of standards set up by Congress to block out
at least the rough outlines of a primary legislative policy. Marshall, who
'This distinction between "constitutional" and "legislative" courts was carefully drawn
by Marshall in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters 511, 546 (U. S. 1828).
It is elaborated in the light of later decisions in Katz, Federal Legislative Courts (1930)
43 HAzv. L. Rzv. 894.
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was a confirmed constitutional pragmatist, virtually made this distinction in
1825 in the case of Wayman v. Southard, although he made no attempt to
find names for the two grades of legislative power. He said:
"It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the courts,
or to any other tribunal, powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which
the legislature may rightfully exercise itself. Without going farther for
examples, we will take that, the legality of which the counsel for the
defendants admit. The 17th section of the judiciary act, and the 7th
section of the additional act, empower the courts respectively to regulate
their practice. It certainly will not be contended that this might not be
done by Congress. The courts, for example, may make rules, directing
the return of writs and processes, the filing of declarations and other
pleadings, and other things of the same description. It will not be contended that these things might not be done by the legislature, without the
intervention of the courts; yet it is not alleged that the power may not
be conferred on the judicial department ...
"The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and
power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to
fill up the details." 55
The courts have continued to use this distinction. It is hard to see why the
neat and effective device whereby the courts sidestepped the problem presented by the non-grantability of "the judicial power of the United States"
does not provide an equally convenient solution to the problem of the nondelegability of legislative power. We *have come very close to adopting the
theory without the names.
Finally, it is hard to escape the conviction that the rule against the delegation of legislative power, like the rule against the merger of the three powers
of government in the same hands, is likely to be assimilated into the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. The delegations of legislative
power which the courts have held bad are those in which legislative power
has been given to executive or administrative officers without the accompanying protection of a guiding standard, a standard which not only serves to
direct the officer exercising the power but which enables a reviewing court
to decide whether he has followed that guidance. There is an important
practical reason for this rule. It is for the protection of the rights of the
citizen that democratic governments vest the exercise of broad and untrammeled legislative discretion in a representative legislature, and not in a
single officer or agency. To permit such an officer or agency to exercise
legislative power without the restraining influence of legislative "standards"
is to subject the citizen to the danger of an arbitrary power against which
'110 Wheat. 1, 42 (1825).
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he may have no very effective protection. It is but a short step from this to
the position that one whose rights have been adversely affected by the exercise of unrestrained legislative discretion in the hands of an administrative
officer or agency is actually being deprived of liberty or property without due
process of law. In short, the effective rule against the delegation of legislative
power as that rule is now construed exists not for the purpose of keeping
alive an abstract principle of political philosophy but for the purpose of
surrounding private rights with a protection just as easily and logically
available under the due process clause. .In fact the doctrine of the nondelegability of legislative power could safely be scrapped as long as due
process of law remains the effective constitutional guarantee it now is.
2.

Can more legislative power be delegated to an independent regulatory
commission than to an executive officer?

The novel and'interesting theory has recently been set forth that Congress
may constitutionally grant more legislative and judicial power to an independent regulatory commission than to an executive officer. Or, to put it in
another way, Congress could not validly delegate to an executive officer the
powers which have been given to such bodies as the Interstate Commerce
Commission or the Federal Trade Commission.
This is worthy of careful consideration. The clearest statement of this
doctrine is to be found in the brief presented to the Supreme Court for the
appellants in Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States in 1937.56 The point
arose in this way. The Economy Act of 1932 authorized the President in the
interests of economy and efficiency to transfer or consolidate by executive
order executive agencies or functions. President Roosevelt in his famous
.Executive Order 6166 of June 10, 1933,, made extensive use of this power,
and, among other changes, transferred the United States Shipping Board to
the Department of Commerce where it became the United States Shipping
Board Bureau. The appellant, a shipping company, attacked the validity of
an order directed against it by the Shipping Board Bureau. It contended that
the Economy Act did not intend to give the President power to transfer or
alter the independent regulatory commissions, of which the Shipping Board
was admittedly one; and that if it did seek to give such power it was, for that
reason, unconstitutional. This was alleged to be true because the powers
enjoyed by the Shipping Board could not validly be given to an executive
officer such as the Secretary of Commerce. In the appellant's brief the argument is stated thus:
"The functions of the United States Shipping Board were so broadly
defined by Congress in the Shipping Act, 1916, and the Merchant Marine
300 U. S. 139 (1937).
Ryan of New York.

The brief and argument were presented by Mr. James W.
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Act, 1920, and were of such a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative character, that they obviously could not be performed properly or at all by
an executive department or bureau, and it would have been a violation
of the fundamental constitutional doctrine of separation of powers if
Congress had intended those functions to be delegated to or exercised
by an executive department or bureau. Assuming that a slight degree of
legislative power may be delegated to an executive department, or rather
become effective after a hearing and finding by an executive department,
surely there is a limit and that is when, as in the present case, the legislative and judicial power attempted to be delegated is so great and substantial, and so inconsistent with its exercise by an executive department,
that the executive department would become predominantly a legislative
or judicial body rather than an executive body, so far as the exercise of
those functions was concerned."s5
The Court decided the case without ruling on this point.
The theory has received other support. It is urged that the language used
in the Schechter case leans definitely in this direction. In that case Chief
Justice Hughes declares that legislative power was invalidly delegated to the
President by the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act which
authorized him to promulgate codes of "fair competition". The term "fair
competition" was an inadequate standard to guide the President's legislative
discretion. To emphasize the point the Chief Justice refers with approval, by
way of contrast, to the Federal Trade Commission's task in applying the
legislative standard, "unfair methods of competition", and goes on to say:
"What are 'unfair methods of competition' are thus to be determined
in particular instances, upon evidence, in the light of particular competitive conditions and of what is found to be a specific and substantial
public interest. . . . To make this possible Congress set up a special
procedure. A commission, a quasi-judicial body, was created. Provision
was made for formal complaint, for notice and hearing, for appropriate
findings of fact supported by adequate evidence, and for judicial review
to give assurance that the action of the Commission is taken within its
statutory authority . ...
"In providing for codes, the National Industrial Recovery Act dispenses with this administrative procedure and with any administrative
procedure of an analogous character."58
From this statement it is inferred that the delegation of power to the
President in the N. I. R. A. is bad because he is an executive officer, while
the delegation of power to the Federal Trade Commission is good because
it is an independent 'quasi-judicial" body.
In testifying before the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Congress
in June, 1937, on the pending Fair Labor Standards Bill, Mr. Robert Jackson,
then Assistant Attorney General of the United States, urged that the admin"Brief for appellant, 48.
'Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 533 (1935).
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istration of the act be given to an independent commission. He stated his
opinion in these words:
"It is important to remember that the Supreme Court very rarely finds
fault with a congressional delegation of power. There is nothing in
the recent decisions of the Court which would justify the Congress in
casting aside a half century of legislative experience in providing for
the administrative handling of modern complexities too numerous and
diverse to be subjected to a single and inflexible rule directly imposed
by the Congress. There is, it should be remembered, no case where
congressional delegation of power has been adjudged invalid where the
delegation has been made to a permanent governmental, administrative
commission, independent of the executive branch of the Government.
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (293 U. S. 388) involved delegation
directly to the Executive; the Schechter case involved not only theoretical
delegation to the-Executive but practical delegation to substantially private code authqrities. Insofar as the decision in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co. (298 U. S. 238, 310-311) rested on the grounds of faulty delegation,
the vice lay in the delegation having been made not to an official or
official body but 'to private persons whose interests may be
and often
59
are adverse to the interest of others in the same business'."
Mr. Jackson did not, however, suggest that this happy fate of delegations
of power to independent commissions was a legitimate result of any doctrine
grounded in the separation of powers.
It seems to me that this whole theory is unsound. There is no valid reason
arising from the doctrine of the separation of powers why the same powers
should not be delegated to an executive officer as to an independent "quasilegislative" and "quasi-judicial" commission. In the first place, there is
nothing in the doctrine of the separation of powers itself which logically
supports such a contention. The rule against delegation of legislative power
was designed to limit the scope and nature of the power which Congress
might turn over to some one else. It was never intended to restrict the
discretion of Congress in selecting the officer or agency to whom the power
was to be given. If Congress can delegate the power at all there is no restriction upon its choice of a grantee. This point is effectively presented in the
brief for the Government in the Isbrandtsen-Mollercase. It is there stated:
"The appellant contends that because the functions of the Shipping
Board were of a quasi-judicial and a quasi-legislative character Congress
could not transfer those functions to an executive department or officer
without violating the doctrine of separation of powers (appellant's brief,
p. 48). Appellant's position appears to be that, although the powers in
question can properly be delegated, the Constitution permits Congress to
delegate them only to a particular kind of officer or agency. This is a
constitutional doctrine, novel in conception and startling in its conse"Joint Hearings before Senate Committee on Education and Labor and House Coinnittee on Labor, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 12.
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quences. Hitherto the doctrine of separation of powers has been applied
to limit the scope of the authority and discretion -which Congress may
confer when it delegates power to an administrative body or agency.
Appellant now seeks to extend the doctrine so as to limit and control
the power of Congress to determine the identity or the personnel of the
agency or instrumentality to which, within the prescribed limits, it may
delegate power. The attempted extensioft is unwarranted; if a power
can be delegated at all it can be delegated to any kind of officer or agency
which Congress may select. If, as appellant suggests, Congress cannot
delegate quasi-legislative .or quasi-judicial power to an executive department or officer, it must, if it wishes to delegate such power at all, create
a special commission or bureau for that purpose. Acceptance of this
principle would .lead inevitably to the creation of a kind of fourth grand
division of the federal government consisting solely of these independent
commissions or bureaus. This is a radical departure from traditional
concepts of the nature of the federal government which finds no support
in the language of the Constitution or in the decisions of this Court." 60
In the second place, the Supreme Court has upheld delegations to executive
officers of the same powers which the independent commissions enjoy, and
has nowhere intimated that they violated the doctrine of the separation of
powers. When Congress enacted the Packers and Stockyards Act of -1921,
it debated at length whether to give the administration of the statute to the
Federal Trade Commission or to the Secretary, of Agriculture. It gave it to
the Secretary., The powers conferred, including rate-making and the suppression of unfair competitive practices, are essentially the same in a more
limited field as those -exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the Federal Trade Commission. The basic constitutionality of this act has
been upheld by the Supreme Court.6' While the Court has scrutinized with
care the procedure by which the Secretary of Agriculture has exercised these
"quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" powers, and has found that procedure
in some cases objectionable, 2 it has never questioned the right of Congress
to confer upon the Secretary the powers he enjoys. It may, furthermore, be
noted that the "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" powers given to the
Secretary are far more extensive than those ever enjoyed by the Shipping
63
Board.
°'Brief for the United States, 78-79.

'Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922).
"Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936) ; Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S.
1 (1938).
'InPanama Refining Co. v.Ryan, 293 .U.S.388, 420 (1935), Chief Justice Hughes
said: "While the present controversy relates to a delegation to the President, the basic
question has a much wider application. If the Congress can make a grant of legislative

authority of the sort attempted by § 9 (c), we find nothing in the Constitution wl~ich
restricts the Congress to the selection of the President as grantee. The Congress may
vest the power in the officer of its choice or in a board or commission such as it may
select or create for the purpose." While the conclusion that Congress may delegate to
the President what it may to a commission does not follow from the premise that -it
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Finally, I believe that what this argument is groping after is in reality a
due process limitation relating to procedure, and not a separation of powers
point at all. It may easily be that a delegation of quasi-legislative and quasijudicial power to an executive officer may be so loosely stated as to be bad,
while a differently stated delegation of the same power to a quasi-judicial
commission would be good. The crucial difference would lie, not in the
nature of the grantee, but in the fairness of the procedure by which the
granted power is to be exercised. This, it seems to me, is all that Chief
Justice Hughes is driving at in the passage in the Schechter case already
quoted. 64 If the National Industrial Recovery Act had granted to the
Federal Trade Commission the same powers in the same terms in which they
were given to the President, the grant would have been equally bad. The
grant to the President was unaccompanied by any procedural requirements
to protect against arbitrary action those subject to the power granted. The
Federal Trade Commission, on the other hand, is required by statute to carry
on its work in accordance with a fair procedure quasi-judicial in character.
If these differences in procedure have constitutional significance it is because
one of them denies due process of law, and not because it delegates legislative power to the wrong kind of agency. This interpretation is further
strengthened by the rigorous care with which the procedure followed by the
Secretary of Agriculture has been examined and the insistence of the Court
that he, though an executive officer, shall administer the Packers and Stockyards Act in accordance with essentially the' same quasi-judicial procedure
employed by the independent regulatory commissions. In short, another
separation of powers argument turns out, upon analysis, to be a due process
argument.
3. Grants of judicial power to the commissions
It is obvious that the doctrine of the separation of powers forbids the giving
to anyone except the courts of the United States the judicial power granted
by the Constitution. At the same time the independent regulatory commissions
exercise powers which look suspiciously like judicial powers. And yet in
the case of these powers, as in the case of the legislative powers delegated
to the commissions, the courts have found no violations of the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers. The explanation of this result comprises
several points which may be briefly summarized.
In the first place, as already noted, 65 the Supreme Court has neatly solved
the problem of any invalid granting of "the judicial power of the United
States", by recognizing the existence and constitutional validity of another
may delegate to a commission what it may .to the President, the language used assumes
the freedom of Congress to select either as its grantee.
"Supra, p. 34.
'5Supra, p. 31.
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brand of federal judicial power which is not "the judicial power of the
United States" within the meaning of Article III. The "judicial power of
the United States" is vested in the constitutional courts created by Congress
under Article III and can be given to no one else. Not only would it be
unconstitutional to grant it to any other body; it would be impossible to
do so. This is true because as soon as it is granted to any one except a
constitutional court the power becomes ipsa facto not the "judicial power of
the United States" but the other sort of federal judicial power, the kind that
can be granted to what are called "legislative courts". Suffice it to say
that Congress has never sought to confer any portion of "the judicial power
of the United States" upon any independent regulatory agency, and this
is the only kind of federal judicial power the granting of which the doctrine
of the separation of powers forbids.
In the second place, it would not violate the doctrine of the separation
of powers for Congress to give federal judicial power to a regulatory commission, as long as it is not "the judicial power of the United States"; but
it would violate the due process clause. 66 To make such a delegation valid
Congress would have to transform the regulatory agency into the kind of body
constitutionally capable of receiving and exercising judicial power. It is
not necessary to discuss here the various attributes which the Court requires
a body to have before it can exercise federal judicial power, but these requirements arise from the mandates of due process of law and not the separation
of powers. The essential and inherent attributes of a court cannot be given
to a non-judicial body, especially an administrative body. The final adjudication of private rights, the independent power to compel testimony, cannot
conformably to due process be delegated to agencies like the Interstate Commerce Commission which also enjoy wide ranges of legislative and administrative discretion. It is, of course, true that not all the line*s of distinction between administrative tribunals such as the independent regulatory commissions
and the "legislative courts" have been sharply drawn in court decisions.
But insofar as those lines of distinction are constitutional in nature they are
pricked out in terms of due process of law and not the separation of powers.
In the third place, the functions of a judicial nature which have been
given to the independent commissions are conveniently labelled "quasi'The Interstate Commerce Commission cannot validly be given the judicial power to
compel testimony and punish recalcitrant witnesses. It is interesting to note that the
reason for this is found not in the rule against the delegation of judicial power but 'in
the due process clause. In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, Mr. Justice
Harlan said: "The inquiry whether a witness before the Commission is bound to answer
a particular question propounded to him, or to produce books, papers, etc., in his possession and called for by that body, is one that cannot be committed to a subordinate
administrative or executive tribunal for final determination. Such a body could not, under
our system of government, and consistently with due process of law, be invested with
authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or imprisonment."
154 U. S. 447, 485 (1894).
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judicial". That effectively meets any objection based on a supposed violation of the separation of powers. There can be no objection to the grant
of "quasi-judicial" powers. Bodies which receive them become, to that extent,
quasi-judicial bodies. Speaking merely etymologically, "quasi-judicial" means
merely "not exactly judicial". In 1854 Attorney-General Caleb Cushing in
his famous opinion on the powers of his own office describes as "quasijudicial" the function of the Attorney-General in rendering opinions to the
President on questions of law.6 7 In recent years the term has acquired a
different and more or less generally accepted meaning, although there are
68
many writers who still strenuously object to the use of the prefix "quasi".
Whether it is proper to use the term or not we need not attempt to decide.
Nor need we attempt to phrase a definition. When it is used, and the Supreme
Court has added it to its vocabulary, it serves to describe such a function as
that exercised by the Federal Trade Commission in issuing a cease and desist
order against an unfair competitive trade practice. Here the legislative and
administrative task of determining that a particular business practice is an
unfair competitive trade practice, and that such a practice has been indulged
in, is combined with the judicial application of the results to the persons
concerned, in the form of a restraining order. The application by an independent commission or an administrative officer of a legislative "standard"
to concrete cases involving the rights of parties and of the public is a "quasijudicial" function. And this is perhaps the most important work of the
independent regulatory commissions; certainly it is the task which most
substantially justifies their separate and independent existence. But in the
grant to the commissions of this "quasi-judicial" power there is no violation
of the doctrine of the separation of powers.
Finally, Congress is wholly within its rights in requiring regulatory bodies,
whether commissions or officers, to perform sub-legislative or administrative
tasks by a procedure substantially judicial in character. The courts insist
that the fixing of a rate is a legislative function. 69 Congress could itself
establish railroad rates by the same procedure by which it passes, any other
statute. But when this rate-making power was given to the Interstate Commerce Commission, Congress required that it be exercised in accordance
with a semi-judicial procedure. And the courts would require such procedure
under due process of law even if Congress did not require it by statute. But
'6 Attorney-General's Opinions 326 (U. S. 1854).

This opinion, which bears the

title "Office and Duties of Attorney-General: Exposition of the constitution of the.
office of Attorney-General as a branch of the executive administration of the United
States", is an important znd illuminating document.

""I do not like that word 'quasi'. I heard a great constitutional lawyer in Maryland
once ask another lawyer whether he thought a statute was constitutional. The re1ly

was that it was 'quasi-constitutional'. I do not like that word 'quasi'." Senator Rayner
in the debate on the Hepburn Bill. 40 CONG. REc. 3782 (1906).
'SSupra note 43.
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here quite obviously there is no grant of judicial power. The power is
legislative; it is only the method of exercising it which is judicial.
By way of summary we may conclude that the doctrine of the separation
of powers has. not been invoked, and will not be invoked, to prevent the
delegation to the independent commissions of substantial legislative and
judicial powers. The doctrine of non-delegation never had much practical
vitality and it has lost through the use of labels and other devices of convenience most of what little it had. But this will not result in the serious
impairment of individual rights or in the exercise of arbitrary power. These
will continue to be unconstitutional as deprivations of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
C.

DOES

THE SEPARATION

COMMISSIONS BE "IN"

OF POWERS

REQUIRE THAT THE INDEPENDENT

SOME ONE OF THE THREE DEPARTMENTS?

A third problem affecting the independent regulatory commissions which
has its origin in the doctrine of the separation of powers may be stated thus:
Does that doctrine require that every federal governmental agency be located
in one of the three departments, legislative, executive, or judicial? If so,
in which of the three departments do the independent regulatory commissions
belong, and what practical legal consequences result from their being in
one rather than another? Is it possible that an agency may constitutionally
be in more than one department at once, or in none of them? If these last
alternatives are possible do they necessarily result in the creation of a "fourth
department"? Unlike the questions dealt with in the first two sections of
this article, these are problems which deal with the "organizational" location
of the commissions and not the nature of their powers. They are important
questions because some judges and writers have assumed that every commission must be in some one department. They have tried to establish which
department this is, although they have had difficulty in agreeing. They have
then proceeded to infer, from this departmental domicile, important conclusions as to the power of Congress or of the President to control the
commissions.
First, does the doctrine of the separation of powers require that every
agency of the federal government be definitely and completely in some one
of the three departments? There is some judicial dictum which leans toward
an affirmative answer. In Kilbourn v. Thompson, decided in 1881, Mr. Justice
Miller said:
"It is believed to be one of the chief merits of the American system
of written constitutional law, that all the powers entrusted to governments, whether state or national, are divided into the three grand departments of the executive, legislative and the judicial, that the functions
appropriated to each of these branches of government shall be vested
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in a separate body of public servants, and that the perfection of the
system requires that the lines which separate and divide these departments shall be broadly and clearly defined." 70
The point is more definitely dealt with by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Springer
v. Philippine Islands in which the Court held void what it regarded as an
exercise by the Philippine legislature of executive power. The Court held that
the Organic Act under which the islands were governed established a separation of the three powers of government identical with that implicit in the
Constitution of the United States. Mr. Justice Sutherland said:
"Thus the Organic Act, following the rule established by the American
Constitutions, both state and Federal, divides the government into three
separate departments-the legislative, executive and judicial. . . And
this separation and the consequent exclusive character of the powers
conferred upon each of the three departments is basic and vital-not
merely a matter of governmental mechanism ....
"
Then, coming to the concrete exercise of power under attack, he continued:
"Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the
Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in character,
and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not
fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes, logical ground
for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining
71 one of the
three among which the powers qf government are divided."
Neither of these utterances had anything to do with independent regulatory
commissions, but they seem to suggest that the Constitution creates three
departments, that these are mutually exclusive of each other, save as the
Constitution provides otherwise, and that an agency must necessarily, therefore, be in one of the three. Applied concretely, this requires that the
Interstate Commerce Commission be in one of the three departments. Obviously the Commission is not in the judicial department. It must then be
either in the legislative department or in the executive department. And there
are those willing to support the claims of each department. The possibility
of any middle ground is completely ruled out. In a word, the Constitution
in dealing with the departments established a perfect trichotomy, and left no
room for any confusing and annoying fringe around the edges.
I am unable to agree with this analysis and the inferences drawn from
it for three reasons. First, I do not believe that the doctrine of the separation
of powers logically precludes the possibility of a governmental agency being
in, or vitally related to, more than one of the three departments of government at the same time. Second, I think that this is the status which the
-'103 -U. S. 168, 190 (1881).
'277 U. S. 189, 201, 202 (1928).
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independent regulatory commissions and certain other agencies occupy, and
that current judicial doctrine and governmental practice have ratified the
arrangement. Third, I believe that the effort to put a regulatory commission
exclusively in a single department is a wholly useless and unprofitable enterprise because no practical constitutional inferences as to the powers and
working relationships of that commission can be built upon the mere fact
of its geographical location in the governmental system. These points I wish
to elaborate.
In the first place, the doctrine of the separation of powers does not
logically require that every governmental agency be snugly located wholly
inside the boundary lines of a single department. It is true that most of
them are so located and that the status of those which are not may seem
anomalous. The three distributing clauses of the Constitution deal with
governmental powers, legislative, executive, and judicial. It is powers not
departments which are separated. The Constitution wisely left to Congress
a great deal of discretion in establishing the governmental machinery by
which these powers are to be exercised. Now under the constitutional doctrine already stated, we may say with assurance that we know the precise
geographical boundary lines of the "judicial department", or the agencies
entrusted with the exercise of "the judicial power of the United States",
since clearly this judicial power can be given only to "the Supreme Court
and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish". The "judicial department", thei1efore, assuming that there is such
a thing, must logically comprise the constitutional courts and nothing else.
But no such precise and definite rule has emerged by which to trace the
boundary lines of the legislative and executive departments. The Constitution by alluding to the "heads of departments" clearly assumes that there
are executive officers besides the President; but there has been no authoritative
answer to the question whether the "legislative department" includes more
than Congress itself, or if so just how much. Now if the doctrine of the
separation of powers had always been applied with such absolute rigidity
that under no circumstances could the three powers of government be either
merged or delegated, we could then draw clear and mutually exclusive departmental lines and determine without difficulty in just which of the three
departments every agency belongs. But we have, with full judicial approval,
scrapped the theory that the three powers of government cannot be merged
in a single agency; and we have practically scrapped the doctrine of the nondelegability of powers. If the doctrine of the separation of powers, as
presently construed, permits a single agency to exercise two or more of the
three powers of government, and permits executive or administrative officers
to exercise legislative power, then by what logical compulsion must we conclude that the doctrine of the separation of powers requires us to locate
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each of these multi-functional agencies in a single one of the three departments? It seems to me much sounder to recognize that we have, and
must have, federal governmental agencies which are not in one department
to the exclusion of the others but which so straddle at least two of the
departments as to be in reality essential parts of each. This I believe to
be the status of the independent -regulatory commissions, a status which
Professor Patterson seems to have had in mind in speaking of "this pluralistic
universe of administrative law". 72
In the second place it is clear that Congress has not attempted to locate
every federal governmental agency entirely inside a single department. It
has proceeded upon the theory that in some cases this cannot and therefore
need not be done. Nor has the idea that the same agency may perhaps be
in or vitally connected with more than one department seriously disturbed
the courts. In short we have not in practice attempted to maintain a rigidly
exclusive three-fold separation of departments. The truth of this statement
may be tested by trying to name the departments in which certain important
governmental agencies actually belong. One may begin with the so-called
"legislative" courts, such as the Court of Claims, the .Customs Court, and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. In which of the three departments of government are these legislative courts located? They exercise
judicial power. They do not, however, exercise "the judicial power of the
United States". Each of these legislative courts was set up to perform by
a more sophisticated judicial procedure a job which has previously been
carried on by executive officers. In the case of the Court of Claims it would
be more accurate to say that the task had been handled both by executive
and legislative officers, since claims against the government had previously
been passed upon both by the Treasury Department and by Congress. Since
these legislative courts are not "constitutional courti" they can hardly be
in the judicial department in the constitutional sense. And yet Congress has
made them in every practical respect so completely independent of Congress
and of the President that they can hardly be in the legislative or executive
departments. It is equally difficult to allocate the United States Board of
"PAT'TRSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES, 5. The following penetrating analysis of the ubiquitous and multi-functional nature of the state insturance commissioner describes with equal accuracy many of the federal regulatory commissions: "We may as well recognize that sometimes the insurance commissioner is an
official clerk, sometimes he is a judge, sometimes he is a law-giver, and sometimes he
is both prosecuting attorney and hangman. He is partly executive, partly judicial, and
partly legislative; and yet he is not confined within any of these categories. I defy
anyone to tell me when he stops legislating and begins to judge, or where he stops
judging and begins to execute. And even if I could have written a book about the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial powers of the commissionier, I should not
by any means have told the whole story. The insurance departments are institutions
with nearly a century of growth, and institutions have a way of not fitting precisely
into our categories. The only way to tell the story of the insurance commissioner is to
tell what he is trying to do and how he is trying to do it." Ibid.
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Tax Appeals. This body was set up to replace the Committee on Appeals
and Review in the Treasury Department. The statute creating the Board
declares it to be "an. independent agency in the executive branch of the
government". The Supreme Court in the case of Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue stated:
"The Board of Tax Appeals is not a court. It is an executive or
administrative board, upon the decision of which the parties are given
an opportunity to base a petition of review to the courts after the administrative inquiry of the board has been had and decided." 73
For all practical purposes, however, the Board of Tax Appeals is a legislative court. Its members are called and call themselves judges (their wives
enjoying social precedence as the wives of federal judges!) ; and while they
do not have life tenure, they have no responsibility to the President or to
Congress, and cannot be directed or controlled by either. The former
declaration by Congress that the Board of Tax Appeals is "in the executive
department" seems to have no relevance to its actual functions or relations.
It is interesting to note that Congress, in setting up two of the independent
regulatory commissions, attempted in a half-hearted way to put them "in"
one of the executive departments, and one of them still remains there. The
Interstate Commerce Commission when established was required to send its
annual report to the Secretary of the Interior who was instructed to provide
the commission with offices and supplies and to approve its expense vouchers
and the appointment and salaries of its employees. 74 The Secretary asked
to be relieved of these responsibilities and the provisions were repealed in
1889.7 5 The Guffey Act of 1935 provided:

"There is hereby established in the
Department of the Interior a National
76
Bituminous Coal Commission,"
and gave to the Secretary of the Interior control of the Commission's budget
and certain other administrative "housekeeping" functions. The Bituminous
Coal Commission Act of 193777 continued the Commission in the Department
of the Interior. But where would the Bituminous Coal Commission be
if it came out of the Department of the Interior? Would it remain in
the executive "branch" of the government, though not in any one of the
ten major "departments", or would it by some automatic process slide over
into the legislative "branch"? If Congress has any definite ideas on this
point it has failed to disclose them. It has not told us where it thinks the
other independent regulatory commissions are located and the only reasonable inference is that it does not regard the question as important.
-279 U. S. 716, 725 (1929).

"4Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 24 STAT. 379, §§ 18, 21.
'Act of March 2, 1889, 25 STAT. 855, §§ 7, 8.
"Act
of August 30, 1935, 49 STAT. 991, § 2.
t
Act of April 26, 1937, 50

STAT.

72, § 2; 15 U. S. C. A. § 829 (Supp. 1938).
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I think there is a tendency upon the part of the Supreme Court to discount the necessity for and the possibility of this rigid drawing of departmental lines. The views so clearly stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in his
dissenting opinion in the Springer case have come to represent more accurately
the present position of the Court than the dogmatic statement quoted from
Kilbourn v. Thompso 78 or Mr. Justice Sutherland's statement in the majority
opinion in the Springer case. 7 Mr. Justice Holmes said:

.

"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to
terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other.... When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more
obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on. . . .It is said that the powers of Congress
cannot be delegated, yet Congress has established the Interstate Commerce Commission, which does legislative, judicial and executive acts,
only softened by a quasi. . . .It does not seem to need argument to
show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and
cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action
with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight
compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from
believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires."80
Furthermore Mr. justice Sutherland himself in the Humphreys case 8 ' implies
that the Federal Trade Commission may be in more than one department
at the same time. While he emphasizes that the commission is "wholly distinct from the executive department", he declares that it is an agent both
of the legislature and of the courts.
In the third place, I believe that the task of allocating governmental
agencies to a single department is completely futile. Perhaps this is why
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has taken the job seriously. The
important thing about any agency is the character of its job, not its
geographical location in the governmental system. It does not seem to me
to be possible to draw any inferences which have any meaning from the
proposition that an agency is in one department rather than another. That
allocation has no necessary bearing upon the powers of the agency, its
working relationships, or its constitutional status. What have we accomplished if we agree that the Board of Tax Appeals is, as Congress has said,
"in the executive branch", or that the Interstate Commerce Commission is
"in the legislative branch"? In neither case have we thereby created any
legal relationships between the agency and the department in which it
is located. The position of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers
"Supra note 70.
"Supra note 71.
: 277 U. S. 189, 209-211 (1928).
'Supra note 46.
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and Stockyards Act makes it clear that a purely executive officer firmly
established in the executive department may be endowed with legislative
powers and be an "agent of Congress". We are forced to the conclusion
that the important thing is what the officer does and not where he is. There
can be no objection to allocating all of the officers and agencies of government to particular departments more or less arbitrarily if we keep it clearly
in mind that in doing so we are merely attaching labels. But as soon as we
begin to build some constitutional or legal inferences as to the powers or
responsibilities of an agency upon the fact that we have allocated that
agency to a particular department, we find ourselves in very deep water. And
if the designations have no practical consequences it is hard for me to conclude
that there is some constitutional necessity for making them.
Does this then mean that we are recognizing, in the case of agencies which
appear to sprawl over departmental division lines, a "fourth department"? I
do not think this logically follows. A "fourth department" would seem to
me to be established only if we were to set up agencies of government which
were wholly independent of the three major departments. Possibly the
legislative courts come closer to being in this category than any other existing
agency. They seem to have been dropped into a sort of governmental vacuum.
But the situation is very different when an agency has close and active
relations with and responsibilities to both Congress and the President. It
seems inaccurate to speak of it as being, or as being in, a fourth department.
It seems accurate to say that it is in two of the existing departments and I
see no constitutional or practical reason why it should not occupy that position. This I think is the position of the independent regulatory commissions,
although their concrete relations with Congress and the President vary with
the nature of the jobs they do.
D.

DOES

THE SEPARATION

LATORY COMMISSIONS

OF POWERS REQUIRE THE INDEPENDENT

REGU-

TO BE CLASSIFIED AS LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE,
OR JUDICIAL AGENCIES?

The attempt to locate each of the regulatory agencies in some one of
the three major departments has proved to be neither very successful nor
very useful. Let us examine and appraise the rather similar effort to
classify these agencies as definitely legislative or executive or judicial, irrespective of their departmental location and also irrespective of the fact that
they are exercising, as we saw at the outset, three kinds of power. Is it
possible, and if so would it be useful, to make this sort of classification?
Does the doctrine of the separation of powers require the precise and mutually
exclusive labelling of governmental agencies in this way? Does it for example require us to determine that the Interstate Commerce Commission is
either a legislative or an executive agency instead of merely determining

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
that it is a legislative and an executive agency? It would be unprofitable
to pursue this inquiry were it not for the fact that here again there is a
disposition in some quarters to work out this iron-clad classification, to determine that the independent regulatory commissions are either legislative or
executive, and then, upon the basis of these labels, to deduce the presence
or absence of Congressional or Presidential authority over them.
It is not necessary to labor the point that the doctrine of the separation
of powers does not logically require the pinning of a single descriptive label
upon each and every governmental agency. It does not, in other words,
preclude the pinning of two or even three such labels on the same agency.
We have already seen that the doctrine of the separation of powers does not
forbid the merger in the hands of one agency or one officer of different kinds
of power. We have seen, furthermore, that the doctrine of the nondelegability of legislative power, as judicially construed, does not prevent
the giving of legislative functions to executive or administrative officers. In
fact it is perfectly clear that the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal
Trade Commission, and the other regulatory commissions do in reality
exercise more than one of the three kinds of power recognized by the doctrine
of the separation of powers. It would be absurd for the courts which have
given that doctrine a definitely realistic interpretation in other respects to
insist that it requires governmental agencies to bear what could only be
regarded as false or misleading labels. To describe the Interstate Commerce
Commission as a legislative agency, if we mean by this that it is exclusively
legislative and nothing else, would be to conceal the truth as to its executive,
administrative and quasi-judicial duties and responsibilities. The same would
be true of any other independent regulatory commission.
If we are not required by the logic of the doctrine of the separation of
powers to make this sort of rigid classification, certainly there is no practical
reason for wishing to do it. If we look at the commissions realistically, we
see that they exercise the characteristic powers of and have actual working
relations with both Congress and the President, and that in certain situations
their judicial or quasi-judicial attributes are conspicuous. The fact is that
the Interstate Commerce Commission is a legislative agency or an administrative agency or a quasi-judicial agency depending upon what part of its particular job one happens to be looking at. It has all three attributes simultaneously,
or perhaps it wotild be more accurate to say that it exhibits them successively
at different stages of its activity. The futility of trying to pin a single label
upon such a body as the Interstate Commerce Commission may be strikingly
illustrated from the legislative history of the commission itself. The story runs
somewhat as follows:
When the Interstate Commerce Act was being debated in the Senate in
1886, Senator Morgan of Alabama was greatly disturbed because the statute
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failed to declare whether the new commission was legislative, executive or
judicial in character. He said:
"We have combined very skillfully powers derived from each of these
departments of the government in the hands of these commissioners;
and I merely wanted to understand whether they were executive officers
or whether
they were legislative officers or whether they were judicial
2
officers."

And he pleaded with the Senate to add to the statute the following amendment for the purpose of settling this point:
"The commissioners appointed under this Act shall be considered and
regarded as being executive officers, and shall not exercise either legislative or judicial powers."8
Senator Morgan seems to have made no impression whatever upon his colleagues. Senator Edmunds pointed out that it was quite unique in the history of legislation to confer concrete powers upon a governmental agency
and then undertake to say that it shall exercise no power of one kind or
another.84 The general view of the Senate on the Morgan amendment seems
to have been accurately voiced by Senator Maxey who said:
"I only want to say that it is not a matter of the slightest consequence
to me whether the powers are called executive, judicial, legislative or
ministerial. We have defined on the face of the bill the powers which
are to be exercised by the commissioners, and if those powers are not
constitutional, that fact ought to be pointed out. Therefore I see no
necessity whatever for the amendment proposed by the Senator from
Alabama."8
In short, in the original debates, Congress refused to be interested' in the
attempt to classify the Interstate Commerce Commission as a legislative,
executive or judicial body. When, however, in 1906 Congress reached the
point of conferring upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the vitally
important power to establish a railroad rate having future application, the
situation changed. The opponents of the Hepburn bill vigorously attacked
what they claimed would be an unconstitutional granting of both legislative
and judicial powers to the commission. Throughout the entire Congressional
debate, therefore, stress was laid by the Congressional leaders upon the point
that the Interstate Commerce Commission was definitely and exclusively an
administrative body and that the new legislation did not alter that status
nor give it legislative or judicial powers. In 1910 Congress passed the MannElkins Act enlarging in certain respects the powers of the Commission and
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establishing the Commerce Court. The act provided that appeals taken from
orders of the Commission should be prosecuted before the Commerce Court
by the Attorney General rather than by the Commission's own legal staff.
This provision evoked sharp criticism on the ground that the Attorney General was thereby given substantial discretionary authority to determine
whether these cases should go to the court. This was alleged to be an
improper intrusion of executive authority into the work of the Commission.
In driving in this argument it was accordingly urged, in sharp contrast to
the position taken in 1906, that the Interstate Commerce Commission was
a legislative agency which must be left wholly free from any executive control. During the long discussions which culminated in the passage of the
Transportation Act in 1920, it was apparent to everyone that important and
far reaching managerial and supervisory powers over the railroads were
destined to be conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission. This
in turn brought out bitter protest and the constitutional basis of the protest
was that the Interstate Commerce Commission is essentially a judicial agency
and that it would therefore be constitutionally improper to confer upon it
these executive and managerial duties. The moral of this story is obvious.
At the outset, with nothing at stake, Congressional leaders were not interested in classifying the Commission as being legislative, executive or judicial.
Later on under the pressure of various supposed assaults upon it, or modifications of it, it loomed up successively as first an administrative body, next
a legislative body, and finally a judicial body.88 The truth is, of course, to
be found in the sum total of all of these classifications for, as we have
already seen, the Interstate Commerce Commission is at the same time legislative, administrative, and judicial. The commission, like a chameleon, changes
color and presents varying characteristics when viewed against the shifting
scenery of differing circumstances and activities. I am leaving to a later
point in this analysis the problem of determining exactly what the relationships are between the independent regulatory commissions and Congress, the
President, and the courts. My present purpose is not to determine the
precise lines of legal or political responsibility which these relationships may
involve. It is merely to point out that the doctrine of the separation of
powers does not require us to fit the independent commissions into a mutually
exclusive three-fold classification. They have important attributes belonging
to all three major departments and there is not the slightest constitutional
objection to recognizing that they are legislative, executive and judicial at
one and the same time. It may be that for certain purposes and in certain
'This bit of historical analysis has been culled from the somewhat elaborate legislative history of the Interstate Commerce Commission to be included in the volume of
which this present article forms a chapter. I have therefore omitted here the detailed
references to the Congressional Record.
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relationships the legislative or administrative aspects of one of these bodies
may be of such controlling importance that it may be useful to classify it
for that particular purpose as legislative rather than administrative, or
administrative rather than legislative. I believe, however, that when this is
true, it will be found to be so because of the concrete jobs given to the
commission rather than to any constitutional or legal inferences drawn from
the nature of commissions in general. For present purposes we may accept
as accurate the comment of Commissioner Joseph B. Eastman that "the
cataloguing of the duties of an independent commission by tags representing
the three traditional subdivisions of the government is little more than an
87
interesting mental exercise".
Nothing seems clearer from a study of this whole problem than the
impossibility and the futility of applying to the vitally important administrative development of the last fifty years any rigid concepts drawn from
the doctrine of the separation of powers. This can, I think, be effectively
illustrated by tracing the development of and the variations in the attitude
upon this point of Mr. Justice Sutherland, who had an almost dominating
share in the judicial interpretation of these problems, and who may be said
to have grown up with the problems as they emerged in varying forms. In
pointing out that his ideas with regard to the practical application of the
doctrine of the separation of powers have undergone many fluctuations over
a period of twenty-five years, I am merely seeking to emphasize how hopeless
and confusing it is to try to apply the abstract formula of the separation of
powers to the practical problems of modern government. Mr. Justice Sutherland's thinking upon this problem seems to have run through the following
phases: First, in 1914 when the Federal Trade Commission bill was being
debated, Mr. Sutherland was United States Senator from Utah. He engaged
actively in the debates on the bill which he bitterly opposed on constitutional
grounds. His position at this time seems to have been this: Congress may
properly create a Federal Trade Commission built along the lines of the
existing Interstate Commerce Commission and endowed with power to investigate unfair competitive trade practices and report its findings back to
Congress for appropriate action. Such a commission Senator Sutherland
referred to as a "legislative commission" and he so designated the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Such a commission was "legislative" because the
power delegated to it was a power which Congress itself could properly
exercise if it had the time and energy. When it was proposed, however, to
give to the Federal Trade Commission the power to issue a cease and desist
order under the procedure set up in the present statute, Senator Sutherland
protested that this was a violation of the doctrine of the separation of powers
112 CoNsT. REVIw
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since it conferred upon a "legislative" commission authority which was
judicial in character. He declared that this power was in reality the power
to issue an injunction, that it was not a power which could be exercised
directly by Congress itself, and that it was not, therefore, a power that could
be given to "legislative" commissions."" It is not important to analyze the
Senator's theory in detail, and it may be pertinently suggested that this was
the argument of a man who was firmly opposed to the passage of the Federal
Trade Commission Act on grounds of general policy. It seems apparent,
however, that either Senator Sutherland had not in 1914 discovered the
possibilities of the terms "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" as a descriptive label for the kind of job assigned to the Federal Trade Commission or,
if he had, he concealed that fact in the interests of furthering his argument.
What he appears to have believed is that a legislative commission can constitutionally be given only the kind of power which Congress itself could
directly exercise. This really amounts to saying that a genuinely regulatory
commission would be a constitutional impossibility.
Second, Senator Sutherland became a justice of the Supreme Court in
1922. In the important case of Myers v. United States 9 in 1926, he is found
with the majority supporting Chief Justice Taft's conclusion that the President's power to remove federal officers appointed by him with the advice
and consent of the Senate is an essential part of the inherent executive power
granted to the President by Article II of the Constitution. Since Mr. Justice
Sutherland concurred without qualification in this case, we may assume that
he either agreed with, or did not feel it important to register disagreement
with, Chief justice Taft's important dictum sweeping the members of the
independent regulatory commissions into the scope of the President's illimitable power of removal.
Third, in 1928 Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote the opinion of the Court in
Springer v. Philippine Islands.90 The passages already quoted from this
opinion make clear the strictness with which he adhered to the orthodox
doctrine of the separation of powers. He announced in that opinion not
only that doctrine but also the doctrine of the separation of departments.
He made it clear that in his opinion if a particular officer or agency of
government is not in either the legislative or judicial departments, he must
of necessity be in the executive department. He appears to rule out the
a"It seems to me there is a clear attempt to vest in this legislative commission judicial
power-power that we cannot exercise ourselves, and that a legislative body cannot
devolve upon a committee of itself or a commission created by it. We can only devolve
upon any such commission the power which we ourselves have, and that is the .legislative power." 51 CONG. Rac. 12651 (1914). For Senator Sutherland's views in greater
detail, see ibid. 11602-11603, 12651, 12652, 12806-12813, 13056.
272 U. S.52 (1926).
"Supra note 71.
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constitutional possibility that an agency may straddle the dividing lines between the three departments in such a way as to be an integral part of
more than one at the same time.
Fourth, in 1935 Mr. justice Sutherland again spoke for the Court in
Humphreys v. United States,91 in which it was held that Congress could
validly restrict by legislation the powel; of the President to remove members
of the Federal Trade Commission. By this time he had either forgotten or
discarded all of the major ideas about the Commission and its powers which
he voiced in the Senate in 1914. Whether this represents an actual change
in his own thinking or merely ai acquiescence in the results of numerous
Supreme Court decisions, we have no way of knowing. He also discards the
dictum of Chief Justice Taft in the Myers case, already mentioned, and with
which he had tacitly agreed. He states in the Hunphreys opinion that the
Federal Trade Commission is "wholly disconnected from the executive department", that it is an agent both of Congress and of the courts, and that
it exercises quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power. Such executive power
as it has is exercised in addition and incidentally to these other powers.
While he does not say in so many words that the commission is "in" the
legislative branch, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that that is what
he means.
Fifth, in 1937 Mr. Justice Sutherland was on the bench during the oral
argument in the Shipping Board cases.92 One who was present in Court at
this time reported the following interesting colloquy which took place. Mr.
James W. Ryan, counsel for the shipping company, was urging upon the
Court the arjument, earlier summarized, that the United States Shipping
Board could not constitutionally be put by executive order or by act of
Congress "in" the executive branch. The Shipping Board, he argued, was
not an "executive agency" and could not be an "executive agency" because it
was not in the executive branch of the government.
Justice Sutherland, who had been sitting back in his chair and asking
occasional questions during the course of the argument, leaned forward
quickly when he heard this.
"Did you say that the Shipping Board was not in the executive branch
of the government?" he said-as though he did not believe he had heard
correctly. Several other Justices smiled condescendingly at counsel as though
he were making a far-fetched proposition.
"Yes, your Honor," Mr. Ryan replied.
"What makes you think that? Where do you find any legal basis for
such a conclusion ?" the Justice wished to know.
"Why in your Honor's opinion in the Humphreys case, this Court held
'Supra note 46.
'Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U. S. 139 (1936).
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that the Federal Trade Commission and similar regulatory agencies were
not in the executive branch of the government. The Shipping Board fell
within the same general category as the Federal Trade Commission and the
Interstate Commerce Commission." Mr. Ryan then proceeded to read certain
portions of that opinion.
"What branch of the Government do you think the Shipping Board was
in, if it was not in the executive branch ?" the Justice wanted to know.
"In the legislative branch, your Honor."
Justice Sutherland shook his head, as though he disagreed, and seemed
to be thinking the question over as the discussion went on to other points.
As we have seen, the Court decided the Shipping Board cases upon grounds
which made it unnecessary to answer these interesting and important constitutional questions, and with Mr. Justice Sutherland's retirement from the
bench we shall probably never know whether he has settled in his own mind
the question whether an independent regulatory commission must of necessity be in one of the three departments and if so whether it is in the legislative or in the executive department.
We may summarize the results of our analysis thus far as follows: First,
the doctrine of the separation of powers does not prevent the merging of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the independent regulatory
commissions. Second, it does not prevent substantial delegations of legislative and judicial power to these commissions. Third, it does not necessitate
the crowding of a commission within the walls of a single branch of the
government. And fourth, it does not require us to pin upon a commission
a single label which brands it as a legislative, an executive, or a judicial
body. Perhaps these results are somewhat negative in character and amount
to little more than the laying of constitutional ghosts. We could hardly hope,
however, to appraise with accuracy the vitally important legal relations of
the commissions to Congress, to the President, and to the courts, without
first knowing to what extent and in what ways those relations are dominated
by the bogey of the eighteenth century doctrine of the separation of powers.
The second part of this article will attempt such an appraisal.
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